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The Indian state has, owing to its history, the sheer size of its population and the 
diversity of its people faced significant challenges to its post-independence 
consolidation, as the state-nation building process marginalized voices and demands 
in the grander narrative of the nationalist leaders. Bringing together lands and 
peoples into a broader Indian national identity had to be achieved through an 
emphasis on common characteristics to gain wider appeal. A centralized structure 
emerging from the legacy of British rule, compounded by a strong and centralised 
Congress Party period of government in the immediate aftermath of independence, 
privileged a centralising nation-building project, as a way of unifying these diverse 
peoples into a cohesive, overarching Indian identity. This was, however, not an 
easy task as people had strong local identities leading to political demands bound up 
with them. The tussle over identity and rights can be said to underlie much of the 
conflict that erupted in independent India.   
 
India is also an unusual, possibly even unique case, as it has faced at least one, and 
often more, armed insurrections within its territory continuously since 
independence, while maintaining a system of democratic rule and an independent 
judiciary with powers of government oversight throughout that period, with one 
brief exception – during the Indira Gandhi declared ―emergency‖ of 1975 to 1977.   
This combination of continuous armed challenge with a relatively resilient 
democracy, makes India a very interesting case in the post ―war on terror‖ and Arab 
Spring era of continuing global democratisation combining with widespread and 
protracted civil conflict.     
 
The Existing State of Knowledge  
The dominant literature on India‖s domestic conflicts and security strategy is 
sharply divided into two broad schools of thought—one considers the Indian 
strategy to be largely accommodationist, while the other castigates it for being 
heavy handed and dominated by excessive securitization of political disputes.  The 
former, espoused by Atul Kohli and Maya Chadda for example takes Indian 
federalism as the biggest factor in support of their argument.
i
 Kohli argues that the 
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institutional arrangements in India‖s federal polity allows for a greater willingness 
to negotiate and accommodate ethnic demands for self-determination, within an 
overall Indian Union.
ii
  His analysis of self-determination movements, both 
regionally-defined and ethnically-defined, focuses on what he regards as the two 
most crucial variables - institutionalisation and leadership strategy.  These he argues 
are the most important factors in determining the trajectory of such movements 
and the conflicts of which they are part.  Kohli argues that an analysis of the cycles 
of such conflict, since the early days of Indian independence, shows that effective 
institutions and willingness of the leadership of separatist groups to accommodate 
demands through some form of power-sharing and autonomy focused institutions 
can succeed in resolving conflict.  These are issues that the Indian state has been 
very capable of delivering, in the creation of new states, in local power-sharing 
arrangements and in new forms of cooperation between the Union government in 
New Delhi and the periphery.  
 
Chadda argues that the various phases of federal reorganization in India since 
independence have been part of the Indian state‖s conscious strategy to 
accommodate ethnic aspirations. In the early years after independence, the main 
task for the leadership was to ensure a strong central government for the 
preservation of India‖s unity.  This was a core principle for the nationalist 
movement during the struggle for independence; and following partition, the 
creation of Pakistan and the first India-Pakistan war, it became the most important 
national objective of the new Indian state.  The fear of further partitions dominated 
all government policy on how to respond to potential and actual separatist and 
territorially focused political movements.  The linguistic reorganization of states in 
1956 was meant to simultaneously reiterate the Centre‖s importance but 
acknowledge the importance of diverse cultures and allow a degree of regional 
autonomy.
iii
 The reorganization of the north eastern region in the 1970s was less 
successful, she argues, due to the centralizing tendencies of then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi. Twin considerations of ethnic accommodation and security 
concerns led to the reorganization of this border region, but the era was marked by 
increasing populism of, and greater demands for autonomy by, the various caste 
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and ethnic political parties that ruled the states across the country. The arbitrary 
use of emergency constitutional provisions by Indira Gandhi to quell political 
dissent translated into an erosion of the democratic character of the Indian state. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s marked the end of Congress dominance and 
emergence of coalition politics in India. Chadda describes the conflicts in this 
period, barring Kashmir, as evidence of a new relationship between the Centre and 
states, wherein demands now began to be couched not in terms of autonomy from 
the centre but of exercising power over the centre.  In this analysis the conflict in 
Kashmir is an outlier, dominated by the India-Pakistan relationship, and not 
representative of how the state responded to other challenges. This analysis stems 
from the fact that coalition partners, from regionalist parties now had a stake in the 
functioning of the central government and could use that influence to pursue their 
own regional interests.  The creation of three new states in the 1990s is further 
testament to the devolution of power away from the Centre, she argues. However 
rather than analyse the effects of the policies in terms of simple dichotomises like 
centralization and decentralization, Chadda defends India‖s federal arrangement as 
successful, while criticising centralization and state oppression during the 1970s and 
1980s.  She argues that without a strong state there can be no democracy, and hence 
centralization has to precede decentralization.    
 
On the other side of the spectrum, there are those who consider the security 
strategies of the Indian state to be centred on force and suppression. For Singh, 
India functions as an ethnic democracy, by which he means that Indian nationalism 
is a disguise for Hindu revivalism, and points to policies in Punjab, and the denial 
of Sikh statehood as evidence of majoritarianism and ―hegemonic control‖.iv The use 
of anti-terrorist strategies in Punjab led to the establishment of what he terms a 
―security state‖ that depended heavily on strong arm tactics. Further, he argues, that 
in spite of the “success” of Punjab, core demands that were behind much of the 
crisis remain unresolved and the state is making a deliberate attempt to legitimize 
the apparent order in Punjab through the electoral process.
v
  The dominant 
interpretation of the Indian state‖s experience in Punjab, has been to focus on the 
―success‖ of highly repressive security strategies and to downplay other factors and 
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this has been used to justify the leading role of military and police responses in 
other conflicts including Kashmir and the Naxalite challenge.
vi
   
 
In a similar vein, Rajat Ganguly argues that the strategy of the state has some 
discernible trends and these follow from the “success” of Punjab.vii As a first step, 
he contends, force is used to tackle violence using both state police forces and 
specially trained paramilitary troops. The introduction of special and emergency 
laws has then strengthened the powers of the security forces and curtailed civil and 
political rights. A third dimension of the state‖s strategy has been to adopt peace 
agreements with chosen insurgents. These accords contain measures to address 
grievances and protect political, cultural or economic rights but, as Ganguly argues, 
these have either failed to tackle root causes in their planning and inception, or 
where they seem to address those issues, they have been weakly implemented.    
 
Writing on India‖s security policy in the north-east, Baruah argues that the counter 
insurgency methods employed by the state have led to the establishment of an 
authoritarian military regime due to the extent of the powers which have been 
given to the armed forces.
viii
 In treating the region as a frontier region, the security 
thinking in New Delhi is dominated by the need to protect the borders so as to 
maintain territorial sovereignty and control infiltration from the east. He also 
argues that there is a lack of concerted effort at ending conflict, suggesting that the 
Indian state has managed disorder at a level that it can live with, and therefore it 
lacks the political will to end the violence. The policy of creating exclusive 
homelands for particular ethnic groups has, moreover, he argues led to 
exclusionary politics, with the civil and human rights of Indian minorities being 
weakened in order to buy off ethno-exclusivist regionalist actors.
ix
 
 
Cohen argues that the roots of most of the political domestic conflicts in India can 
be traced to the state‖s neglect of democratic politics in the early stages of the 
challenges to state authority.  For him, the counter insurgency strategy of the 
Indian state follows a pattern bereft of historical contexts and past experiences and 
hence shifts attention away from core issues.
x
  Using the same heavy handed 
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responses in Kashmir in the 1990s as was followed in Punjab and the north east in 
earlier periods led to heavy human costs and human rights abuses and resulted in 
the widespread alienation of the local population in the insurgent areas. The state 
viewed the Kashmiri demand for greater state autonomy as a threat to national 
integrity, thereby providing legitimacy for the imposition of central rule and a 
highly militarised response.
xi
  The Indian government acted as if Pakistan had 
invaded and the national state was at risk, with few challenges allowed at central 
government to this dominant interpretation of events.  In contrast to Chadda‖s 
analysis, which links centralisation and state strengthening to more flexible policies 
on decentralisation and autonomy, Hardgrave argues that the Indian state has 
become increasingly centralized and sees this as a primary cause of conflict.
xii
 He 
observes that ―in its attempts to quell endemic unrest and the challenge of 
terrorism, India has enacted a plethora of laws that have become instruments of 
repression; police and paramilitary abuses seem to get worse while all sorts of other 
violations of human rights are reported with numbing frequency‖.xiii 
 
These two schools of thought offer very different interpretations of the trajectory 
of modern Indian approaches to internal security challenges.  This chapter cannot 
provide a summary of these conflicts or the specialised literature on each of them 
but rather looks at the changes and continuities in the attitude and responses of the 
Indian state and offers a re-interpretation and possible synthesis of these competing 
views.  Focusing on the most significant challenges to its authority and legitimacy, 
from the failed / suppressed insurrection in Punjab in the 1980s which has not re-
ignited, the Kashmir conflict, the multiple conflicts in the North East and the on-
going Naxalite/ Maoist insurgency this chapter explores the approach of the India 
states to conflict management and insurgency.   
 
It shows how different categories of domestic conflict have been dealt with 
differently by the state and points to the multiplicity of factors including cross-
border networks and lack of timely and concerted political action that exacerbate 
violence. Where conflicts have abated, such as in Punjab, scholarly opinion on its 
―success‖ remains divided. The analysis of conflicts and state responses in this 
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chapter suggests that there is no coherent internal security strategy and while this 
may be a strength due to its ability to heed to contextual differences, the Indian 
state has so far failed to capitalize on this for successful conflict resolution.  
 
 
Analysing the Diversity of India’s Internal Conflicts 
Broadly, India‖s domestic conflicts might be categorized under three themes-
territorial, developmental and localized communal conflicts based on the demands 
and issues raised. Without arguing that in each of these, there is only a single ―root 
cause‖, these overlapping themes point to the main issues over which conflict has 
arisen and continues to be fought. Each conflict is inevitably complex and 
encompasses underlying causes which are territorial, political, social, economic and 
human rights based.  
 
Territorial conflicts, those conflicts that have at their core the demand for secession 
or greater autonomy, have been the most common type of armed conflict in India.  
British colonial rule included a large variety of local forms in India, including a 
large number of ―Princely states‖, with a degree of local sovereignty as long as they 
accepted and did not challenge the British empire.  At the eve of independence, 
these princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, Bhopal and Hyderabad, as 
well as parts of the north east, such as the Nagaland who never accepted that they 
were part of ―British India‖ demanded independence or various degrees of self-
determination.  Territorial issues were most potent for the Indian state as it sought 
to avoid a repeat of the Pakistan partition and to maintain the sovereignty of the 
state. 
 
Jammu and Kashmir- the early phase 
The very moment of India‖s independence, saw the origins of its most protracted 
internal challenge – in Kashmir.   The contestation over the precise sequence of 
events and its relationship to the wider India-Pakistan war is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, however Jammu and Kashmir‖s accession to the Indian state was from 
the beginning regarded as a special case, even by the new Indian government.   
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While loudly blaming Britain as the colonial power and Pakistan for cross border 
interventions and ―occupation‖ of part of the former princely state territory, India 
acknowledged Kashmir‖s special status in a number of ways, including an initial 
acceptance of a role for the United Nations and even a possible plebiscite
xiv
 and in 
1950 by the guarantee of a ―special status‖ under Article 370 of the Indian 
constitution such that the state of Jammu and Kashmir would have autonomy over 
all subjects except foreign affairs, defence and communications.  
 
Though there can be little doubt of Kashmiri‖s strong sense of identity, the special 
autonomy was ratified by an agreement signed between Nehru and the Kashmiri 
nationalist leader Abdullah in 1952, indicating that solutions other than 
independence may have been broadly acceptable.  However the special status was 
more honoured in its breach than its implementation and Abdullah himself was to 
spend lengthy periods in prison as New Delhi saw his popularity as a threat.  
Various local pressures including some local Hindu demands for complete accession 
and integration of Jammu and Kashmir under one Constitution, a desire by New 
Delhi to impose a more centralised form of rule and attempts by Pakistan to use 
the situation to its own advantage, have ensured that the relative importance of 
nationalist separatism, development challenges, desire for autonomy, inter-group 
tensions between Hindu‖s and Muslims and later between the demands of 
secularists and Islamists has never been tested, by a meaningful offer of enhanced 
autonomy and socio-economic development.   
 
After the breach with Abdullah New Delhi appointed a puppet government which 
passed and adopted in 1954 a resolution that affirmed Kashmir as a part of India and 
enabled New Delhi to implement in Kashmir those constitutional provisions that 
had not previously been applicable to it. It is this amendment to Kashmir‖s 
constitution that paved the way for greater intervention by New Delhi including 
the suspension of fundamental liberties and the extension of the Supreme Court‖s 
jurisdiction in Kashmir.
xv
  When in 1956 India officially withdrew the plebiscite 
offer, it cited this constitutional amendment as one of the reasons for the changed 
circumstances.  Even as Pakistan went to the UN to request it to intervene, and 
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though the UNSC affirmed its earlier position calling for India and Pakistan to 
make arrangement to include the views of the people of Kashmir in talks on their 
future, India continued to reject the UNSC‖s proposals. State elections in 1957 and 
1962, in which the Congress-backed candidate won, were widely believed to be 
farcical, given the suppression of political opposition in the state. In 1964, two 
important legislations were extended to Kashmir—Article 356, which empowers 
the Centre to dismiss elected state governments and impose President‖s Rule, and 
Article 357 that enabled the Centre to take over all legislative functions of the state. 
By then, the autonomy that was promised to Kashmir in 1950 was almost 
completely eroded in practice.  
 
The 1970s and 1980s were dominated by attempt by New Delhi to impose ever 
more centralised control on J&K.  Local politicians were only allowed a role in 
running the state, if they accepted a clear subservient role.  Elections in 1977, 
widely held to be fair brought to power a government led by the National 
Conference leader.
xvi
  However their demands to revert to the pre-1953 status and 
ensuring Kashmir‖s autonomy were rejected by New Delhi. In the late 1980s, the 
Centre continued to dismiss governments at will and the elections in 1986 which 
brought the Congress and NC into a coalition government, were widely alleged to 
be rigged.   The turnaround of the NC, with Farooq Abdullah (son of the first 
chief minister Sheikh Abdullah) declaring that to remain in politics he had to stay 
on the right side of the Centre, was met with a rise of militant groups such as the 
JKLF in 1987.
xvii
 With this began a phase of increasing militancy and violence that 
was met with severe repression by the State and discussed further below.  
 
The North East 
Amongst the earliest challenges that the Indian state had to face, were those that 
rejected the very terms of their accession into the Indian Union. The Naga tribes in 
the north-east for example considered the merger of the Naga inhabited areas into 
the Indian Union as contentious, and sought to claim an independent homeland of 
their own. The run up to India‖s independence was marked by successive claims of 
independence and self-determination by the Nagas, and on 14 August 1947 they 
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declared their independence.
xviii
  In spite of talks between Indian political leaders at 
the Centre and Naga leaders over the rights of the Nagas to remain autonomous, 
the Hills were incorporated into the Indian Union as a district within the state of 
Assam in India‖s far north east. This decision, and the subsequent indifference of 
the Centre to the demands of the Naga people led to growing alienation of the 
Nagas.
xix
  Even as the moderates within the Naga movement gradually entered the 
Indian political system and achieved their demand for a separate state of Nagaland 
within the country in 1963, there remained sufficient support for independence to 
sustain an armed challenge, which was met with brute force by the Indian security 
forces, leading to spiralling violence and deepening distrust between the Centre and 
the people of this region.  
 
The wider North East is a good example of the complexity of over-lapping 
territorial claims and the difficulty, even in the best of circumstances of finding 
well-balanced solutions. Manipur and Tripura in the north east were princely states 
that were incorporated into India after its independence. The Meitis in Manipur 
however made a demand for independence soon after. The fact that the earlier 
demand of the Naga tribes for independence of their territory included parts of 
Manipur led to inter-group hostility, and added to the multidimensionality of 
conflicts in this region.  In Tripura, violence erupted in the 1960s, and was 
triggered by large scale migration of Bengalis from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 
which radically altered the ethnic demography in the state and led to the creation 
of militant organisations demanding protection of their rights and territories from 
these ―outsiders‖.  In adjoining Mizoram, Mizo tribes fought an armed conflict, 
both in protest at the existing chieftain system, which had been in place before 
1947 and which effectively oppressed the Mizos at the hands of the powerful chiefs  
and what they characterised as economic and political neglect by the Assam state 
government – dominated by the much larger Assamese population. The trigger to 
the conflict came in the aftermath of a widespread famine in the region in 1959 and 
the neglect of the state and central government in responding to the crisis.  An 
attempt by New Delhi to deal with this conflict via the creation of the state of 
Mizoram in 1972 (full statehood being granted in 1987) led to conflict de-escalation 
 10 
in Mizoram but to intensified political disputes with Assam over the division of its 
state territory by the centre.   
 
Assam itself saw political tensions break into armed conflict in 1979.  Though 
framed as a demand for complete independence, most analysis sees the conflict as 
triggered by a combination of issues, each of which were, from the beginning, 
capable of being dealt with, by solutions other than sovereign statehood – including 
the relative economic underdevelopment of the region despite its amble natural 
resources, the fall out over the breakup of the state of Assam to deal with the above 
mentioned conflicts, without consulting the elected state government and the issue 
of large scale illegal immigration. 
xx
  The creation of ULFA (the United Liberation 
Front of Assam) as an armed organisation added to the intensity of the conflict and 
the movement itself provided a trigger to non-Assamese minorities in the state to 
demand greater autonomy for fear of being side-lined by the Assamese.  A highly 
militarised response alienated many moderate voices and deepened ethno-national 
divisions, and the underlying linkages of identity, migration and economic 
development actually became clearer over the years as ULFA increasingly focused 
on anti-Bengali rhetoric in efforts to mobilise support. 
 
The conflict in Assam including an international dimension, during periods when 
relations between India and Bangladesh wee poor as Bangladesh sought to increase 
its negotiation leverage by allowing ULFA and others to establish training and 
logistics bases in its isolated regions.  The intervention was very different to that 
with Pakistan however, as Bangladesh in addition to more credibly arguing that 
such isolated areas inherently difficult to police, also never sought to diplomatically 
make common cause with Assamese fighters.  The Indian response to ULFA still 
mirrored the ―borderland‖ policy evidenced earlier in Punjab and Kashmir, seeing 
ULFA as offering a credible threat to the territorial integrity of the state.  
Securitisation, the successive appointment of former security chiefs as state 
governors, and de-facto security primacy in all local political decisions led to 
widening alienation of the local population. The military tactic of refusing to 
negotiate centrally with the ULFA leadership on core issues and instead seeking to 
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persuade individuals or small groups of ULFA fighters to ―surrender‖, with financial 
inducements (and according to reliable local sources) with a blind-eye to subsequent 
criminal activity by what were called S-ULFA groups (surrendered-ULFA) while 
tactically success to some extent,  was strategically disastrous in extending the 
conflict and the degree of lawlessness in the region.  Ultimately a failure by ULFA 
to make progress, the closure of cross-border bases as India‖s relations with 
Bangladesh improved and an anti-ULFA crackdown in Bhutan in 2003 by the 
Government there, at India‖s request, together with a limited shift in strategy by 
the Indian government, including the opening of negotiations with a weakened 
ULFA saw a move towards conflict de-escalation. Talks between ULFA and Indian 
Government approved mediators in 2005-6 led to a ceasefire.  While that ultimately 
collapsed, a new ceasefire in July 2011 and an agreement between ULFA, the Indian 
Government and the state Government of Assam in September 2011, seems to be 
holding at the time of writing.
xxi
  While this agreement seems to point to a de-
escalation in Assam, the equivalent and longer-running process with the Nagas has 
thus far failed to lead to an enduring peace and so the wider North East remains a 
zone of conflict. 
 
Punjab 
Though Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland saw conflict from the 1940s, the former 
was primarily seen as an inter-state issue with Pakistan and Nagaland was perceived 
as remote and peripheral from New Delhi.  The upsurge of armed insurrection in 
Punjab was therefore the first largely internal armed insurrection faced by India 
post-independence.  In the 1970s, the demand of the Akali Sikhs in Punjab for the 
creation of a Punjabi speaking state, which had begun in the 1950s, grew in 
strength. What had made matters worse was the division of Punjab in 1966 which 
created a new state of Haryana. This reorganisation also led to the division and 
transfer of control of Punjab‖s water resources in what the Sikhs felt was an unfair 
division.  However unlike the linguistic challenges in the South, discussed in the 
next section, this demand was characterised by the Centre as a fundamentally 
religious demand rather than a linguistic one – as a demand for a Sikh 
―homeland‖.xxii  The Punjab case did have this added dimension and Akali Sikhs did 
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focus on what they say as the failure of the Indian state to fulfil rights ―guaranteed‖ 
to Sikhs at the time of independence.
xxiii
  It was not a straightforward ethno-
national movement based on religion or religiously defined culture, as most Sikhs 
did not support the demand for Punjabi independence.  The Akalis did however 
become increasingly frustrated by first, the failure to secure a Punjabi speaking state 
in the initial re-organisation of states in the late 1950s and subsequent to that, the 
treatment by the Centre towards Punjab   
 
Jugdep Chima argues that the socio-economic conditions in Punjab in the 1960s 
produced levels of dissatisfaction and tension, led to a transformation of societal 
organisation which in turn affected political consciousness culminating in the Akali 
movement.
xxiv
  Political repression under Indira Gandhi in the 1970s across the 
country was felt bitterly in Punjab where she dismissed elected state governments 
in order to check the rise of the Akalis.   Though ultimately the demand for 
―Khalistan‖ became a classic separatist demand based on a form of Punjabi-Sikh 
nationalism, the prior trajectory of the conflict and the limited social basis for the 
national movement means other factors, remained crucial.  While initially the 
ethno-nationalist movement was broadly based on the demand for greater 
autonomy, the rise of an extremist Sikh politics within it advocating violence and 
secession was countered by use of the armed forces and a massive army operation 
on the Golden Temple in Punjab in 1984 aimed at flushing out Sikh militants had 
repercussions for both communities, as well as for the future for the conflict.
xxv
 The 
dismissal of elected state governments and imposition of President‖s Rule, recurrent 
features in the preceding years of political mayhem in the state, continued even 
after the signing of the peace accord in 1985 owing to high levels of militancy in the 
state. The end of the 1980s and first few years of the 1990s saw heightened levels of 
violence by both militants and security forces, with massive human rights 
violations on both sides. The end of the violence, largely an effort of police and 
military force, signalled to the State the end of the crisis in Punjab.  
 
Punjab has entered the Indian state discourse as evidence that a harsh security 
strategy – most famously in this case led by the police commander KPS Gill – was 
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sufficient to end a militant insurgency, with very limited political concessions.  The 
attack on the Golden Temple and the security crackdown after the assassination on 
Indira Gandhi added to this interpretation that Punjab was solved through a 
security dominated counter-insurgency approach.    However this narrative neglects 
the repeated negotiations with Sikh nationalists, the normalisation of state-Centre 
relations and the change of political circumstances, after the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi which made achieving broad political support for an escalation of armed 
action more difficult. 
 
Linguistic Based Demands 
Over-lapping with the armed challenges in the border regions of the North East 
and North West, other territorial conflicts have taken identity markers such as 
language to define themselves vis a vis the Indian state and demand territorial 
autonomy.  This was sparked by a post-colonial desire by the Congress Party elites 
in New Delhi to replace the colonial language English with Hindi as the language 
of the central state, of internal inter-state communication and of public schooling.  
There was widespread opposition and violence in the south in particular, where 
Hindi is not widely spoken and where it was seen as the language of the ―North‖ 
and at the height of the crisis, the demand for secession was raised.
xxvi
  With the rise 
of the DMK in Tamil politics as a major political force and its calls for secession of 
southern states, the central state had to respond.
xxvii
  Although political leaders were 
arrested and there was widespread police brutality and months of strikes and 
protests continued, the state never sought to characterise the conflict as an 
existential one and it was ultimately resolved with the maintenance of English as an 
official language and withdrawal of compulsory learning of Hindi in schools.  This 
ability by New Delhi to separate the linguistic issue from the demands for 
separatism and to respond with a linguistic solution, was to be a widely copied 
precedent which saw the reformulation of states throughout India on largely 
linguistic grounds and the later creation of new states and new official languages.  
The process of state formation in India is not over;  new states have been created on 
various grounds, such as Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chattisgarh, and demands 
continue to be made in other places such as Telangana and Gorkhaland, but the 
 14 
process of state machinery to deal with such demands has prevented such demands 
from becoming armed insurrections.   Neither does the government of India see the 
demand for new states as an existential threat to the state.  They may resist the 
demands, for political reasons, but the level of contestation is ultimately within the 
frame of normal politics, not outside it and there is no underlying fear that unrest 
and rioting will lead to full armed conflict.     
 
The Naxalite Challenge 
Even if territorially based conflicts have clear causal factors other than separatist 
demands or even linguistic or national identity which makes the seeking of a single 
explanation for conflict a futile endeavour the Indian state has faced other serious 
armed challenge where territory and separatism have played no significant role at 
all.  This has been most obvious in the ―developmental‖ insurgencies of the various 
Naxalite movements and also in the repeated upsurges of caste or sectarian 
violence.   
 
Protesting against the land ownership and tenure system, in 1967 a group of 
peasants revolted and triggered a movement of peasants and landless labourers.
xxviii
 
This movement spread to other parts of the country as well and took its name from 
the district in which it started-Naxalbari. The Naxalite movement has in its various 
phases of activity been described as a developmental conflict, a law and order 
problem and a left wing (usually called Maoist) guerrilla movement.   There has 
been an increase in Naxalite activity in recent years, with the Indian prime minister 
terming it the gravest internal security threat.
xxix
  Naxalite groups now operate in 
over 200 districts and this left wing extremism, as it is described by New Delhi, has 
seen acts of violence against security personnel and officials on a higher scale than 
before.   Notwithstanding its protracted nature and the extent of territory affected, 
and indeed the level of popular media coverage within India itself, the Naxalite 
insurgencies have not received the same degree of academic analysis as separatist 
conflicts, especially by academics outside of India.  There is little dispute that the 
conflicts are driven by poverty and underdevelopment at the macro level but it is 
the precise nature of the causes in the different districts which is hotly disputed.  In 
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its earlier phases two competing narratives were visible in Indian discourse.  Firstly 
they were dismissed as armed agrarianism, a resort to localised violence by poor 
and uneducated people against local landlords and those elements of the state, 
including police who they saw as upholding the position of wealthy landowners.  
Secondly and in contradiction they were characterised as being the result of a 
planned Maoist rebellion.  This was portrayed as being aided by China, after the 
breach in India-China relations as a result of the 1962 border war with China, and 
when being linked to China could be presented as being anti-national.  Later as 
relations with China improved, allegations of external involvement usually focused 
on the powerful Maoist guerrilla movement in Nepal.   However these attempts by 
the state to blame external forces were never taken as seriously as similar allegations 
against Pakistan and were usually seen as self-serving.  An alternative explanation 
for the insurgency sees them as a loosely connected series of conflicts around land 
and poverty, in which Maoist movements have become involved, without a doubt, 
but which at the heart are caused by issues such as the appropriation of land 
belonging to or historically used by marginalised communities, including tribal 
groups, for the purposes of mining, the building of dams for hydro-electric power 
and other aspects of industrial development.  Armed conflict  is argued has become 
widespread due to the perception by such groups that they have no ability to 
influence decision-making and due to a long record of promised compensation in 
cash and alternative land not being delivered on.  This interpretation is articulated 
not simply by the hard left, but also by civil society groups focused on human 
rights and by prominent personalities such as Arundhati Roy.
xxx
   Maoists in these 
circumstances have offered arms, some local leadership and a cadre able to articulate 
a message to outsiders and the media, but that is a very different role than that 
suggested by those who see the ―cause‖ of conflict as being ideologically  inspired 
hopes of vanguard led revolution.  It also suggests a response short of revolution 
might well resolve the armed insurgencies.  
 
The state response to the Naxalite conflicts highlights the tensions around internal 
security strategy.  The numbers of deaths and the degree of insurrection is by any 
measure a greater security challenge that generated by ULFA in Assam, but the 
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level of military response while significant, has not reached those levels and in 
particular the degree of securitisation of civilian government is much lower.  The 
reasons for the different approach are complex and no consensus exists among 
analysts, but certainly the earlier attempts to explain the ―Maoist‖ uprisings as being 
engineered by China have no credibility even amongst those close to the central 
government and therefore the more traditional ―external threat‖ justification used in 
Punjab and especially Kashmir to push through a highly militarised response has no 
real resonance.   
 
There is a minor precedence for this tension between government pressure and 
military perspective.  During the 1975-77 emergency Indira Ghandi reported 
ordered the army to shoot at unarmed female protestors in Gujarat in the so-called 
―Thali Revolution‖ over poverty and food shortages, but the army refused to act.   
The importance of developmental rhetoric in Indian government discourse from 
the early days of the state to the present also makes it more difficult to reject as 
unreasonable or threatening a demand for sustainable economic development or for 
protection of environment resources such as forest land.
xxxi
  Whatever the most 
important causes, and without diminishing the human rights issues raises by ―anti-
Maoist‖ security operations, it is clear that a different approach is being taken in 
this case compared to the territorial conflicts in border areas.  In response to high 
profile campaigning by Indian civil society groups against army operations in 
Naxalite areas – commonly referred to in the media at the time as ―Operation 
Greenhunt‖ – Minister for State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Shri Jintendra 
Singh, in written reply to a question in the Lok Sabha denied any such Operation 
Greenhunt existed.
xxxii
   The Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah 
recently commented on the difference in approach, when querying why the army 
were insisting on maintaining the full use of emergency legislation in the Armed 
Forces Special Powers act in J&K, while not seeking to use it in areas dominated by 
Naxalites.
xxxiii
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Religion and Caste defined conflict 
With more than 80% of its population identifying themselves as Hindus, and a 
strong minority population of Muslims (11-13%), Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis 
and tribal faiths, India accords all religions equal legal status and rights. However, 
tensions between religious groups, known by the nomenclature of communalism in 
India, have been frequent, though localized.
xxxiv
 The politicization and mobilization 
of caste and religion have only strengthened the forces of communalism in India, as 
politicians vie for community-based votes.   At the time of the framing of the 
Constitution, the debates about the role of religion played an important theme of 
debate. While the Constitution upheld the secular character of the Indian state and 
assured religious freedom and protection of its minorities, the manner of 
implementation has sometimes led to contentious policies. On the one hand, there 
have been allegations of minority appeasement while on the other, it has been 
suggested that India is a majoritarian democracy due to a strong Hindu cultural 
presence permeating various aspects of political life.
xxxv
 Majoritarian mobilization 
and its manifestation of violence, as in Punjab in the 1980s and in Gujarat in 2002, 
reflect a lethal combination of religion and politics. One of the most violent 
periods of inter-communal relations was the demolition of the Babri mosque by 
Hindu activists in 1992 and the subsequent eruption of riots between Hindus and 
Muslims across the country.  Local communal riots between Hindus and Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikhs, and between caste groups have been frequent occurrences and 
vary in scale and location. Caste conflicts have taken various dimensions; apart 
from caste conflicts between high and low castes, there have also been instances of 
two castes at the same hierarchy fighting over political reservations and caste-
related benefits.
xxxvi
  While these are clearly part of the wider picture of domestic 
conflicts in India they are not further addressed in this chapter as they have never 
developed into a sustained, armed and organised conflict, in the same manner as the 
others discussed above.    
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Jammu and Kashmir from the 1990s 
While the conflict in and about Jammu and Kashmir defined the early years of 
Indian independence it was the renewed upsurge in armed activity and street 
violence within Kashmir from the late 1980s, which brought Kashmir back to 
world attention.  The collapse of any meaningful local autonomy with J&K saw a 
decline in support for the National Conference and the rise of more militant voices.  
Initially these were mostly indigenous to the Kashmir Valley, but a combination of 
Pakistan‖s desire to take advantage and insurgents need to arms and external 
support saw a shift towards a greater leadership role for militant groups trained in 
Pakistan which then infiltrated into Kashmir and the movement was split between 
separatists and pro-Pakistan militant groups.    
 
The stationing of army and paramilitary troops in the state, and the levels of 
military deployment along the LOC make Kashmir one of the most heavily 
militarized regions in the world.
xxxvii
 Since the 1990s, there have been human rights 
violations on both sides. Anti-India sentiment has grown as a result of these 
military excesses-disappearances, killings, detentions, instances of rape and 
desecration of holy shrines.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the 
narrative of the insurrection from the 1990s onwards.  There have been periods of 
intense violence and other times when circumstances seemed favourable for 
political progress.  In the most recent period the elections of 2008 with a relatively 
high turnout in most parts of Kashmir except Srinagar (compared to previous 
widespread boycotts) was followed in 2010 by renewed street clashes in response to 
security force killings and then high turnout at 2011 panchayat elections.
xxxviii
   
Nonetheless while street clashes are frequent in urban areas, the level of sustained 
armed insurgency is at a low level compared to the 1990s and while no formal talks 
have begun and stalemate still characterises the overall situation there are some 
small signs which one could be optimistic about. 
 
It is difficult to see any political progress inside J&K in the absence of an improved 
relationship between India and Pakistan.  As long as one or both states see the 
other as offering a real and present danger to their very existence then using 
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Kashmir as a weapon against the other will always be preferable to the risky 
business of peace negotiations.  Likewise internal militants, both separatists seeking 
independence and the Hindu right demanding unrestricted integration with India, 
have no incentive to moderate their demands to take account of the internal 
diversity within Jammu and Kashmir as long as they can rely on powerful external 
supporters in New Delhi or Islamabad.  (While Kashmiri Muslims form the 
majority in the valley and adjoining areas, the state also has a significant Hindu 
population in Jammu and a Buddhist population in Ladakh. Therefore any solution 
required an internal agreement as well as agreement between India and Pakistan). 
 
India‖s approach to Kashmir has followed the perceived ―success‖ of a security-
dominated strategy in Punjab in the 1980s, with centralisation of power and a 
massive deployment of troops and paramilitary police.  The alternative 
interpretations of Punjab, that it was successful only when the centre moved from 
an exclusively security response to incorporating local voices, or indeed that it 
remains problematic because of excessive centralisation remain marginal voices in 
government.
xxxix
    This approach has alienated much of the public, has made it 
impossible for local moderate voices to strengthen their popular support and has 
allowed separatists to maintain a political position that negotiations with New 
Delhi are impossible.   
 
Efforts by the Centre have been short-sighted, and the setting up of five working 
groups in 2006 to deal with Centre-state relations, improving relations across the 
LoC, economic development, release of detainees, rehabilitation of militants‖ 
families and better governance has remained at best an insincere intention as 
recommendations of these groups have been slow to come, and when suggested, 
have not been implemented.
xl
 Some debate about lifting the notorious Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act from parts of Kashmir has begun in political circles in 
Delhi as a confidence building measure in the region but opinion remains divided. 
Inaction by the Centre on crucial political issues has been the bête noire in 
Kashmir.     
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The first decade of the 21
st
 century suggests a shift in the Centre‖s discourse on 
Kashmir. In the period following September 2001, attempts were made, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to link Kashmir with the global jihadi network.  While this was 
understandably raised again in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the India state 
has since 2010 sought to re-open talks with Pakistan on the one hand and with 
Kashmiri separatists on the other, though the appointment of three ―Interlocutors‖ 
and some reductions in the security presence.
xli
   
 
The street protests and violence of 2010 show how easy it is to trigger mass upsurge 
in Kashmir. Amidst the glaring silence and failure of the Centre to respond, 
autonomy once again became a hotly contested term in parliamentary debates in 
New Delhi after PM Manmohan Singh raised the issue as a possible solution so 
long as it was within the ambit of the constitution. Even as the Kashmir state 
government insisted on autonomy as a solution, opposition parties in Delhi 
criticised the government for bringing it up, effectively demonstrating the lack of 
consensus on the Kashmir issue.
xlii
  
 
The report of the interlocutors has called for constitutionally guaranteed greater 
autonomy in Kashmir through devolution of power and limited the powers of the 
Centre to intervene in matters not pertaining to national security, measures which 
it acknowledges are not radical or new.
xliii
 However, what remains to be seen is 
how New Delhi would respond to these recommendations.   
 
The Hurriyat remains opposed to direct talks with New Delhi unless Pakistan is 
also involved on a three-party basis.  India is unwilling to have Pakistan discuss 
―internal‖ matters.  India also continues to refuse any offers of international 
assistance, seeing such a development as a threat to its own position.  There also 
appears to be a move towards locating the conflict in terms of the youth and their 
economic concerns such as development and employment, but whether this is part 
of an effort to promote a potential ―peace dividend‖ or a return to a failed strategy 
of seeking to pacify Kashmir with investment but without a political solution 
remains unclear.
xliv
  There has been increasing voices within India looking for some 
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flexibility
xlv
 and   Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, has stated his belief that the 
Indian ―Constitution is a remarkably flexible instrument, capable of 
accommodating a diverse range of aspirations‖.xlvi  However Kashmir has been the 
conflict where in reality the least flexibility has been shown and where military 
power and centralised rule have dominated strategic thinking and the potential for 
a negotiated solution has not been seriously tested.   
 
Analysing the Trajectory of State Responses to Insurgency 
The 1947 war with Pakistan and the characterisation of the Kashmir dispute since 
then as an Indo-Pakistan conflict, led to the emergence of the Indian military (and 
later special police units) as among the most important institutions in the state, 
notwithstanding the relatively marginal role of armed groups in the nationalist 
movement and in the post-independence nation building project.  This new 
prominence was seen to some extent in the repressive response to the Naga 
rebellion, but was subsequently to be strongly re-enforced by the dominance of 
special police forces in the Punjab and the dominance of the military (along with 
paramilitaries and police) in Kashmir in the 1990s.      
 
India has been most successful in dealing with linguistically-based challenges.  They 
have (if you exclude Punjab, where other dimensions of the conflict were more 
important) been successfully contained within the Indian institutions, and while it 
is a dynamic process leading occasionally to high-level street protests, such demands 
and protests have never been treated as a threat to the Indian Union itself.  The 
North East has occupied a middle ground position.  It shares some of the 
characteristics of Kashmir, as a border-zone (from the perspective of New Delhi), 
but after 1971, even in those periods when relations with Bangladesh were poor the 
conflicts in the North East were never seen as fundamental to the state.  A heavy 
handed military led strategy along with centralisation of power and human rights 
abuses has dominated on some occasions.  At other times, the formation of new 
states, negotiations with armed groups and development strategies have been added 
to the approach of the centre.  In response to the obvious military and political 
stalemate, a ceasefire has proved possible in Assam, while intermittent negotiations 
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and occasional ceasefires has occurred in Nagaland, even if they are yet to provide a 
solution. 
 
Kashmir and the Naxalite situations remain the two most critical conflicts for the 
Indian state.  Kashmir, notwithstanding some signs of potential change remains 
fundamentally constrained by being viewed as first and foremost a product of 
external interference by Pakistan.  This perception has allowed a caricature of the 
Punjab strategy – focused almost exclusively on military led counter-terrorism 
strategies  - to dominate the response of the centre.  Despite widespread human 
rights criticism, inside and outside of India, even minimal confidence building 
measures such as the partial withdrawal of the draconian Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act have not been taken.
xlvii
  Neither is there any proactive strategy to offer 
a process of negotiations that is attractive to other actors in the conflict.  There is 
therefore no pressure on internal actors to shift from the status quo. Kashmir 
remains in a stalemate, requiring a new initiative from India and Pakistan to move 
it.  The Naxalite conflict offers an interesting counterpoint to India‖s response in 
Kashmir. Despite being listed by PM Manmohan Singh as one the gravest security 
threat faced by India – along with cross border terror and religious fundamentalism 
- the security response has been more balanced.
xlviii
  The role of the army is more 
limited, local state elites are part of the political and security response and there has 
been a clear (if limited) acceptance that more needs to be done to deal with 
underlying environmental and poverty focused grievances.   
 
The trajectory of Indian responses to conflict therefore offers some support for 
each of the dominant schools of analysis, but the context within which each 
approach is followed in practice is very different.  In linguistic based conflicts the 
flexibility of the Indian response as outlined by Chadda and Kohli is clear.  
However in the conflicts of the border zones, this is seldom seen – and almost 
never so in Kashmir, where the critiques of Sumit Ganguly, Gurharpal Singh are all 
too visible.  State responses in Kashmir have been centralised and too little 
informed by the reality of local threat levels.  Of course cross border infiltration 
occurred and Pakistan‖s ISI did seek to use situations to their advantage, but the 
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response of the India government added to the alienation of Kashmiri‖s and offered 
no credible political alternative to the rhetoric of the Hurriyat and others.  No 
autonomy was accorded Kashmiri political actors; everything was analysed through 
the prism of Pakistan.  The tensions between these two aspects of India 
government strategy on internal conflict has never been resolved.  The Naxalites 
cannot credibly be dismissed as foreign infiltrators, so the full military response 
seen in Kashmir is not politically possible.  However the state has not developed 
the strategies to integrate a more positive political and development engagement, 
with a more appropriate security response and so the Naxalite conflict is caught in 
the middle and has moved from the margins to the mainstream of Indian political 
life. 
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